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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
J & M CATTLE COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant -
Respondent, 
FARMERS NATIONAL BANK, 
and 
Defendant -Counterclaim ant -
Appellant; 
JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Supreme Court Docket No. 41023-2013 
Twin Falls County Docket No. 2012-3020 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District for Twin Falls County. The 
Honorable Randy J. Stoker, District Judge, presiding. 
John S. Ritchie 
COLEMAN, RITCHIE & CLUFF 
PO Box 525 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0525 
Attorneyfor Defendant-Counterclaimant-
Appellant 
David H. Penney 
COSHO HUMPHREY, LLP 
PO Box 9518 
Boise,ID 83707-9518 
A ttorn ey for Plaint!ff-Counterdefendant-
Respondent 
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ARGUMENT IN REBUTTAL 
A. 
FARMERS NATIONAL BANK DISAGREES WITH THE CONCLUSION REACHED 
BY DISTRICT JUDGE RANDY J. STOKER 
Farmers National Bank has spent five pages identifying the mistakes made by 
Judge Stoker. Appellant's Brief pages 15-20. Despite that fact, J & M argues that "both 
Farmers and J & M agree with Judge Stoker's analysis" and "Farmers states an analysis in its 
memorandum that agrees with Judge Stoker and the position taken by J & M." Respondent's 
Brief, pages 1 and 2. 
Judge Stoker was presented an undisputed set of facts and proceeded to 
incorrectly analyze the issues as set forth in the Appellant's Brief. Farmers National Bank 
objects to any claim that it agrees with Judge Stoker's analysis. 
B. 
FARMERS NATIONAL BANK HAS ESTABLISHED THAT IDAHO CODE §4S-80S 
TRUMPS IDAHO CODE §28-9-333(b) BY "EXPRESSLY PROVIDING OTHERWISE" 
J & M argues that Farmers National Bank "leaps over the critical analysis" 
relating to expressly providing otherwise, because the definition of "express" is fatal to its 
argument. Respondent's Brief, page 3. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
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Fmmers National Bank addresses the issue head on its first argument consisting of 
ten pages. Appellant's Brief, pages 5-15. J & M relies primarily on a Black's Law Dictionary 
definition in an attempt to thwart all of the arb'1lments of Fanners National Bank. \Vhile Farmers 
National Bank does not dispute the holding in Saint Alphonsus Divers{fied Care, Inc. v. J\1RI 
Associates, LLP. 148 Idaho 479, 488, 224 P.3d 1068 (2009), it does dispute that the case is 
dispositive of the issue before the Court. 
J & M argues that Judge Stoker found Idaho Code §45-805 (c) to be ambiguous, 
and therefore, because the subsection is ambiguous it cannot state anything, because anything 
expressly stated is by definition unambiguous. The definition of "express" is not a single 
definition, however, but a recitation of a number of different possible meanings. The definition 
of "express" as set forth by the Supreme Court in Saint Alphonsus is: 
"Clear; definite; explicit; plain; direct; unmistakable; not dubious or 
ambiguous. Declared in tenns; set forth in words. Directly and distinctly 
stated. Made known distinctly and explicitly, and not left to inference. 
, Express' means' Manifested by direct and appropriate language. '" 
Black's Law Dictionary. 
One of the many offered meanings is "Declared in terms; set forth in words." 
Such a definition is consistent with the argument of Fanners National Bank as to what IS 
intended by Idaho Code §28-9-333(b) in light of the official comment to that section. 
Of course, the fact that something is expressly stated in the sense of "set forth in 
words" does not preclude that it is ambiguous. Whether the last sentence of Idaho Code §45-
805(c) is ambiguous is a question of law and Judge Stoker's conclusion that it is ambiguous is 
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subject to full review on appeal. \\l1ile Fanners National Bank asserts it is not ambiguous, even 
if it is, this does not preclude satisfying the "expressly provides otherwise" test under Idaho Code 
§28-9-333(b). 
C. 
DISAGREEMENT BY THE PARTIES OVER WHETHER IDAHO CODE §4S-80S(c) 
EXPRESSLY PROVIDES THAT PRIOR PERFECTED SECURITY INTERESTS HAVE 
PRIORITY, DOES NOT INDICATE THERE IS NO SUCH EXPRESS PROVISION 
J & M asserts "The fact Idaho Code §45-805( c) supports such vigorous debate 
over what the legislature meant is illustrative of the fact that subsection (c) fails to create an 
exception under Idaho Code §28-9-333(b)." Respondent's Brief, p. 6. J & M's argument is in 
effect that, if the parties disagree about the meaning of a statutory provision, the provision is ipso 
facto not expressly stated. That argument lacks merit. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated in 
the context of statutory interpretation that "Ambibruity is not established merely because the 
parties present differing interpretations to the court." State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471,476,163 
P .3d 1183 (2007); Hayden Lake Fire Protection District v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 312, 109 P .3d 
16 I (2004). That the parties in this case are advocating conflicting interpretations of the last 
sentence of Idaho Code §45-805(c) is no basis whatsoever for concluding that the sentence is 
ambiguous, unclear or otherwise fails to expressly provide that prior perfected security interests 
have senior lien status over liens under Idaho Code §45-805. 
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D. 
IDAHO CODE § 45-805(c) EXPRESSLY ASSIGNS PRIORITY TO PRIOR PERFECTED 
SECURITY INTERESTS OVER POSSESSORY LIENS CREATED UNDER IDAHO 
CODE §45-805 
J & M argues there is no "express statement" in the text of Idaho Code §45-805( c) 
that security interests have priOlity over Idaho Code §805 liens. Respondent's Brief pp. 6-9. In 
support of its position J & M asserts "the word 'priority' is not used" in subsection (c). 
Respondent's Brief p. 6-7. Although the word "priority" does not occur, the subsection does 
state that "prior perfected security interests," not simply "security interests" are to be paid from 
the proceeds of sale. The reference is clearly to security interests which are perfected prior in 
time to when a possessory lien under Idaho Code §45-805 attaches. This distinction is 
important. J & M argues that the only reason the legislature added "prior perfect security 
interest" to the last sentence of Idaho Code §45-805(c) was to make clear that prior perfected 
security interests would be paid before any remainder was paid over to the owner. Respondent's 
Brief, p. 8. However, if that was all the legislature meant, there would have been no reason to 
restrict payment to only prior perfected security interests. Any security interest, regardless of 
whether perfected prior to or subsequent to the possessory lien, would be entitled to payment 
before pay1nent of any remainder to the owner. The express reference in the last sentence of 
subsection (c) to prior perfected security interests is, therefore, clearly indicative that the listing 
of claims to be paid is a listing of the order in which they are to be paid. The listing of claims in 
the order in which they are to be paid is by definition listing them as to relative priority. In the 
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matter of competing liens, having priority simply means the right to be paid first. A definition 
given under the entry for "Priority" in Black's Law Dictionary, Ninth Ed., is "a creditor's right to 
have a claim paid before other creditors of the same debtor receive payment." 
E. 
THERE IS NO SINGLE FORM OF STATUTORY LANGUAGE BY WHICH THE 
IDAHO LEGISLATURE ASSIGNS LIEN PRIORITIES 
J & M cites numerous Idaho lien statutes as examples of express statements of 
lien priority. Respondent's Brief, pp. 9-1l. What the list shows is that the legislature has not 
adopted a single preferred way of stating the order of priority among liens in the same property. 
It is of little significance that the f011n of expression chosen by the legislature to express lien 
priority in drafting Idaho Code §45-805(c) is not identical to any of the fOnTIS of expression in 
other lien statutes used to provide rules of lien priority. 
F. 
J & M HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT IDAHO CODE §45-805(a) 
EXPRESSL Y STA TES THAT A PRIOR PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST HAS 
PRIORITY OVER A LIEN UNDER THAT SUBSECTION 
J & M asserts that Idaho Code §45-805(a) expressly provides that a pnor 
perfected secUlity interest has priority over a possessory lien created under that subsection unless 
the possessory lien holder has followed the specified notice procedure before perfonning the 
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service which is the basis for its lien. Tr. P. 51. Judge Stoker likewise stated that Idaho Code 
§45-805(a) "is illustrative of a statute which does expressly resolve the priority issue addressed 
in Idaho Code §28-9-933(b). Tr. p. 97. Fanners National Bank asserts, however, that Idaho 
Code §45-805(a) only presupposes that prior perfected security interests are in general senior to 
possessory liens under subsection 805(a) and that presupposition is only justified by the priority 
rule expressly stated in subsection 805(c) . Appellant's Brief, p. 13. In its Respondent's Brief, 
pp. 19-20, J & M attempts to demonstrate that subsection 805(a) does not presuppose the priority 
rule, but expressly states it, and that there is no reason to look to subsection 805( c) for an express 
statement of the rule. J & M's analysis is this: 
The analysis required by subsection (a) begins with the prior perfected security 
interest having priority because it is the only secured interest in existence. For the 
holder of a potential possessory lien to establish priority, they must perfonn the 
notice procedures "before commencing any such service." Until the holder of the 
possessor lien perfonns the notice procedures and renders a service, there is no 
possessory lien in competition with a prior perfected security interest. The 
language in subsection (c) has nothing to do with the analysis under subsection 
(a). [emphasis added] 
Respondent's Brief, p. 19. J & M's analysis is logically flawed. When a security interest is the 
only lien which has attached to certain property, it makes no sense to say it has priority over 
anything (except the interest of the owner). The issue of priority as between two liens arises only 
after the second lien attaches. So it is still correct to say that subsection 805(a) makes sense 
only if it is presupposed that the prior perfected security interest will have priority over the 
possessory lien when the possessory lien attaches, unless the notice procedure is followed. It 
bears repeating that the ordering of lien priority in subsection 805( c) is the only and obvious 
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justification for this presupposition. Without this presupposition there would be no need or 
reason for the notice procedure by which the possessory lien holder can achieve priority. The 
possessory lien would already have priority pursuant to Idaho Code §28-9-333(b). 
If J & M's analysis were to be applied to subsection 805(b), then it is ironic to 
note that a prior perfected security interest would always come ahead of an agister lien. Before 
the possessory lien attaches any prior perfected security interest would have priority because it 
"is the only secured interest in existence," but there is no notice procedure in subsection (b) of 
which the agister may avail itself (as in subsection (a)) to overcome that priority. This is 
obviously a flawed analysis, but it is exactly the same analysis which J & M applies to 
subsection (a). 
CONCLUSION 
The Final Judgment entered by the trial court should be reversed. Judgment 
should be issued in favor of Farmers National Bank declaring that it is entitled to all proceeds 
from the sale of cattle pursuant to its prior perfected security agreement. 
DATED this day of October, 2013. 
--
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COLEMAN, RITCHIE & CLUFF 
for Defendant -Counterc1aimant-
Appellant 
Fanners National Bank 
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